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This paper takes the neoclassical model of the investment decision
of the ﬁrm and adds a Moral Hazard problem to it. The Moral Haz-
ard problem, which arise due to the separation between ownership and
control, induces empirical results from sample splits which are usually
interpreted as a sign of ﬁnancial constraints. These results are a con-
sequence of the departure from the benchmark linear framework of the
Neoclassical model. In short, curvature can be a result of either ad-
justment costs, credit constraints, or of a Moral Hazard problem if the
manager has a concave utility function. In addition, the Moral Haz-
ard problem is greatly exacerbated in the presence of a compensation
structure with limited liability. This induces volatility in the ﬁrm, and
depending on the model parameters can generate large losses for the
ﬁrm coupled with generous compensation outcomes for management.
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11 Introduction
A pervasive theme in the investment literature is the study of the nature
of adjustment costs.1 The particular nature of the technology of investment
aﬀects its dynamic properties and therefore the response to shocks and poli-
cies. Here, the literature has found evidence of lumpiness and inaction at
the plant level, but also a smoother behaviour at the ﬁrm level, which has
supported the widespread use of quadratic adjustment costs in models of the
investment decision of the ﬁrm.
A second theme in this literature is whether we can detect imperfections
in credit markets from the observed investment behaviour of diﬀerent ﬁrms.
These credit market imperfections again aﬀect the way economies react to
shocks and to economic policies. The investment literature has uncovered a
ﬁrm level pattern of sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow which has typi-
cally been taken as evidence of the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. Recent
criticism, however, has pointed out that measurement error and/or model
mispeciﬁcation can generate the patterns of sensitivity of investment to cash
ﬂow observed in empirical exercises.2
The present paper ﬁts in the mispeciﬁcation literature. I ask the ques-
tion: can we mistakenly infer from empirical exercises the existence of credit
constraints and/or investment adjustment costs, when in fact the true struc-
tural model has a Moral Hazard problem at the ﬁrm level? The model in
this paper is a standard neoclassical model of investment with output sub-
ject to diminishing returns. To this structure I add in turn adjustment costs,
credit constraints, and a Moral Hazard problem. The Moral Hazard problem
is imposed on it by having the investment decision be taken by a manager
who maximizes an objective function which diﬀers from shareholder value.
The model is very stylized and is a reduced form for incentive problems.3 I
explore several possibilities for the objective function of the manager. Cur-
vature in the optimal decision function, and therefore a behaviour like that
under adjustment costs and credit constraints, arises due to the fact that the
manager has a concave objective function.
The model is then simulated under a calibrated set of parameter values,
and a series of moments from artiﬁcial data is compared to a set of moments
taken from a cut of the Compustat data - including moments from standard
sample splits. A "good" model will have moments of its artiﬁcial data that
are close to the moments of the real data. On this score the Moral Hazard
models can outperform either the credit constraints or the adjustment costs
1Cooper and Haltiwanger (2004), Hall (2002).
2See Gomes (2000), Erickson and Whited (2000), Cooper and Ejarque (2001).
3See work by Covas (2004), Phillipon (2004), and a survey by Andrade et al. (2001).
2model, depending on the metric used.
Finally, the paper explores diﬀerent compensation structures, showing
that Moral Hazard problems which arise due to the separation between own-
ership and control are exacerbated by a compensation structure with limited
liability. This induces volatility in the ﬁrm’s output, and depending on the
model parameters can generate large losses for the ﬁrm coupled with generous
compensation outcomes for management.
2T h e D a t a
The data is a cut from Compustat used in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
Some summary statistics of the data are presented here.4 There are 428 ﬁrms
and 12 years of data from 1978 to 1989.
2.1 Basic Moments
For each ﬁrm and each variable I compute its mean, standard deviation, ﬁrst
order autocorrelation (by regressing the variable against a constant and its
lag and getting the OLS coeﬃcient on the lag), and the ratio of its standard
deviation to its mean over the 12 period sample. This yields a distribution
of 428 means (µ), standard deviations, (σ), AR1 coeﬃcients, (ρ), and ratios.
The following table shows the cross sectional mean (CSM) of these ﬁrm level
moments for ﬁve variables.5
CSM I/K S/K OI/K CF/K V/K
µ 0.1724 3.1425 0.3775 0.2464 2.5121
σ 0.0922 0.6309 0.1365 0.0938 0.9680
ρ 0.2374 0.6533 0.5626 0.5083 0.6131
σ/µ 0.5241 0.2017 0.4369 0.1434 0.3682
Additional moments of interest are the relationships between standard
deviations and persistence of diﬀerent variables. The next table again shows
cross sectional means (CSM) and standard deviations (CSSD) over the 428
4See their paper for details. I: investment, K: capital, S: sales, CF: cash ﬂow, OI:
operating income, and V/K is Tobin´s (average) Q.
5One remark on the standard deviation of investment: if we just take one long column
with the I/K data for all ﬁrms and periods, and take its mean we get the same (obviously)
but if we take the standard deviation of this long variable we get 0.1230, slightly higher
than the cross sectional average of ﬁrm level standard deviations which is 0.0922.




Any representative ﬁrm model we study must be able to reproduce some
key aspects of these tables.
2.2 Q Regressions
Next, I present a series of regression results with diﬀerent estimators on this
data. I do not try to reproduce the regressions of Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995) but rather present a series of regressions that can be easily reproduced
by the reader, and that are suggestive of the eﬀects we want to look at later.
The basic equation in levels contains a trend and is
It
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and for this equation I use a simple pooled OLS estimator in levels wich has
12 observations for each ﬁrm, and 428 ﬁr m sf o rt h ef u l ls a m p l e . 6
B u tw h i l et h em o d e lw i l ln o th a v eﬁxed eﬀects, it is conceivable that the
data might have such type of heterogeneity among ﬁrms, which it is typically
assumed to be correctly removed by ﬁrst diﬀerencing. The above regression

















For this equation I show two estimators. First, a simple pooled OLS
estimator in ﬁrst diﬀerences which has 11 observations for each ﬁrm (and no
trend). Finally a basic pooled Instrumental Variables estimator, where the
instruments are the second lag of the explanatory variables.7 This regression
6We must note that this equation is not ad-hoc, but rather, it arises from the Euler
equation of the hayashi linear quadratic model, which is the baseline in the literature.
Here the baseline deviates from it in two ways: there are no quadratic adjustment costs
and revenues are not linear since α<1. The concavity of revenues alone is suﬃcient to
make cash ﬂow signiﬁcant in the standard regression so that is not the point here.
7Standard errors are just the square root of the covariance matrix, which here is given
by (X´ Z(Z´ ee ´ Z)−1Z´ X)−1, where Z is the instrument matrix and e is the error from the
ﬁrst stage regression.
4has 9 observations in the time dimension for each ﬁrm.






























The dummy variable is an indicator of a sample split. In this case I use
only one criterion, which is a rank of dividend payments.8 This is in fact the
main aspect of the literature on credit constraints, and while typically diﬀer-
ent regressions are run on the diﬀerent subpanels, here I simply introduce a
dummy indicator with a value of 1 if the ﬁrm is a low dividend paying ﬁrm.
We expect the sign of α5 to be positive indicating a higher sensitivity to cash
ﬂow for such ﬁrms, in line with the literature. This is a simpler exercise
which will allow for an easier comparison with the artiﬁcial data since only
one regression is necessary.
T h e r ea r eaf e wi m p o r t a n to u t c o m e st on o t eh e r e .F i r s t ,t h el o wv a l u e s
for the R squared. Second, the fact that the coeﬃcients on the dummy
variable are positive but not signiﬁcant. Third, the fact that cash ﬂow is
very signiﬁcant and its coeﬃcent is one order of magnitude higher than the
coeﬃcient on Q.
2.3 Volatility Regressions.
Here I run a simple cross section regression by OLS in the spirit of Cantor
(1990). The dependent variable is, for each ﬁrm (j), the standard deviation of
the investment to capital ratio (σ
j
i/k) and the right hand side variables are a
constant (with coeﬁcient α1), a dummy that qualiﬁes the sample, (α2), a size
measure, (α3), and the standard deviation of the sales to capital ratio (σ
j
s/k),
(α4). The dummy here splits the sample between high and low dividend
paying ﬁrms, exactly the same way as above, and has a value of 1 for a low
dividend paying ﬁrm. The size measure is the capital stock in 1984, which
8There are two sample splits in the empirical regressions of Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995) that can be replicated with artiﬁcial data. One is between small and large ﬁrms,
and another is between high and low dividend ﬁrms. Low dividend ﬁrms are those below
the 25th cross section percentile of the 1984 ratio of dividends to operating income. Small
ﬁrms are the ﬁrms that are below the 25th cross section percentile of capital in 1984. Big
ﬁrms are above the 25th percentile. Later, with the artiﬁcial data I use period 7 sample
capital stock and sample dividends over revenues for each ﬁrm.
5is the size measure available in this cut of the Compustat. Again, there are
j =1:4 2 8ﬁrms/observations. The equation is
σ
j

















The result of this regression is in the following table with T statistics in the
bottom row:
α1 α2 α3 α4 R2
Va lu e 0.1293 −0.0488 −0.0070 0.0163 0.1056
Tstat 10.90 2.05 4.48 2.76
According to Cantor we expect the sign of α2 to be positive. While
in Cantor´s paper that is true, in this sample that is not the case.9 A
positive sign would imply that "constrained" ﬁrms display higher volatility
of investment over and above what is structurally implied by its volatility
of sales, after controlling for size. Note also that smaller ﬁrms have slightly
higher - but signiﬁcant - volatility.
2.4 Moment Selection.
For the exercise that follows in this paper we need to select a set of moments
which will be used to test the models developed below. The appropriate
moments are related to the structural parameters of the model we are inter-
ested in. For example, if matching the value of average q is a key criterion,
we must be very careful in choosing the curvature of revenues since it directly
determines proﬁtability. Likewise, if volatilities and persistence of investment
are the main moments we are interested in, the parameters of the stochastic
process as well as the parameters of adjustment costs are key factors aﬀecting
our target moments. Of course all components of the model aﬀect these dif-
ferent moments, but some have more direct impact on them. The moments
used in this paper are set in bold type in the previous tables.
Some discussion of the moments not included is in order. The average
of I/K is not used because the depreciation rate is a calibrated parameter
which will not be estimated. Averages of cash ﬂow, operating income and
sales are not used because the mapping from these data concepts to our
9This regression is the one that can be reproduced with artiﬁcial data. In the model
there is no bond rating variable. Using a dummy to qualify the sample according to a
bond rating, the dummy comes out positive but not statistically signiﬁcant. If we use
the dummy (D) in a multiplicative way by adding the variable product D × σ(S/K),t h e
results change again and in some cases the dummy is then positive and signiﬁcant.
6revenues variable in the model is imperfect. Instead, the average Q is used
since it maps directly into the curvature of proﬁts. On the other hand, the
fact that operating income and cash ﬂow have reasonably close standard
deviations and close to the standard deviation of investment, while their
persistence parameter is double that of investment seems to be a pattern we
should want to replicate. The coeﬃcient on the dummy in the Q regression
is not included because the dummy is not signiﬁcant in this data. Ironically,
its T statistic is low, and that is signiﬁcant. The robust features here seem
to be the higher order of magnitude of the cash ﬂow coeﬃcient and the low
R squared. The low R squared is included despite the fact that it is hard to
get low R squared with artiﬁcial data. The volatility regressions are also not
considered because they yield mixed results. We will look at these type of
moments later, but they will not be used for estimation and statistical model
comparison. Clearly the choice of moments aﬀects our outcome in terms of
choice of model. However, I believe the selection criteria have been agnostic
with respect to the outcomes.
Additionally, the Neoclassical model cannot generate the relative patterns
of volatility of investment and Q. No internal structural source of volatility
can generate enough volatility in the value function without increasing even
more the volatility of investment and output. Several things seem to be
incompatible: high average Q´s imply curvature because proﬁts are required.
But curvature implies a smoothing of volatility. Therefore, the standard
deviation of Q cannot be a moment we want to match without adding some
external source of noise to the model. That is straying away from the research
s t r a t e g yb u ti td o e sh a v es o m eu s e f u li m p l i c a t i o n s :i tr e d u c e st h ec o e ﬃcient
and signiﬁcance of the Q variable in the regressions with artiﬁcial data and
of course their R squared, and, in the Moral Hazard problems, a given source
of market noise in Q may have implications for what severity of Moral hazard
we may recover from the data.
Finally, in the appendix I show the distribution of I/K which does not
point towards the existence of ﬁxed costs of adjustment at the ﬁrm level
in this sample. There is no signiﬁcant incidence of very low or very high
investment ratios, but rather a unimodal distribution with most of the mass
concentrated around the mean.
73M o d e l
Consider a ﬁrm which produces using only capital (k). The ﬁrm´s prof-
its/dividends are discounted at the factor β =1 /(1 + r),a n da r eg i v e nb y




where 0 <α<1. A is a technology shock with persistence parameter ρ and
standard deviation σ. Capital obeys kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + It.T h e r e a r e t w o
components which are added (separately) to this basic model.
One component is simply a non negativity (credit) constraint on divi-
dends, which delivers the model:
Π(At,k t,k t+1)=Atk
α
t − It ≥ 0
The other component is the standard quadratic adjustment cost function
which sets dividends to:
Π(At,k t,k t+1)=Atk
α








In this case no restrictions are imposed on Π. In all of these three versions the
value of the ﬁrm is simply the present value of dividends under the optimal
decision. The parameters of the model so far are α,β,δ,γ,ρ,σ.
3.1 Moral Hazard
Suppose decisions in this ﬁrm are taken by a manager who has a diﬀerent
objective function than that of the owners of the ﬁrm. Dividends are:
Π(At,k t,k t+1)=yt − It = Atk
α
t − It
T h ef a c tt h a tt h em a n a g e ra n dt h eﬁrm have diﬀerent objective functions is
t h es o u r c eo ft h eM o r a lH a z a r d( M H )p r o b l e m .T h em a n a g e rw i l lm a x i m i z e
10See page 231 of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998). Here sales, operating income and
cash ﬂow are essencially the same and equal to revenues (Atkα
t ). This is because in the
data we subtract the cost of goods sold (and other expenses) from sales to get operating
income, but our revenues are already net of the wage bill and of variable factors. Then
from operating income to cash ﬂow we subtract taxes and interest payments, neither of
which exists in this simple framwork - although both of them are easy to include.
B yt h es a m er e a s o n i n g ,p r o ﬁts and dividends are the same in the model, whereas in the
data dividends are often unrelated to current performance. The present model trivializes
dividends.
8a utility function, and the respective dynamic programming problem is given
by
S (At,k t)= m a x
kt+1≥0
[u(At,k t,k t+1)+βEtS (At+1,k t+1)]
Now, once the optimal policy kt+1 = g(At,k t) is found, we can compute
the market value of the ﬁrm W (At,k t), mechanically as
W (At,k t)=Π(At,k t,g(At,k t)) + βEtW (At+1,k t+1)
where for simplicity we assume all agents (and the market) have the same
discount factor, β. Naturally, this market value (W) will diﬀer from the ﬁrst
best value of the ﬁrm (denoted V (At,k t)) where we simply maximize proﬁts.
This simple problem is interesting for several reasons. First, it allows
us to measure - in a calibrated implementation of the problem - how diﬀer-
e n to b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o n sf o rt h em a n a g e ra ﬀect the market value of the ﬁrm
relative to the ﬁrst best. Second, it allows us to model, by choosing the util-
ity function, the particular type of Moral Hazard we have in mind. Third,
this simple structure is a reduced form for a more general problem where
an incentive contract is implemented to minimize the MH problem, and is
therefore not necessarily restrictive in this area.11
Throughout we will use the CRRA utility function as a reduced form for
the MH problem which implies the manager does not like ﬂuctuations.12 The












The Euler equation of the problem of the manager has a deterministic
steady state given by r + δ = αAkα−1. Note that in the second MH case,
none of the parameters (w,φ)a ﬀects the steady state. One key characteris-
tic of the solution to the dynamic programming problem (DPP) is that, in
the baseline problem, the policy functions kt+1 = gFB(At,k t), are horizon-
tal in the (kt+1,k t) space, that is, they are independent of current capital,
gFB(At,k t)=gFB(At). However, with constraints, adjustment costs, or
11One diﬀerence that may result from an endogenous incentive contract is that the man-
ager may face a borrowing constraint, as capital structure is used for incentive purposes.
12See Reiche (2004) for a discussion of the amount of hedging top executives do on the
option component of their compensation. This is suggestive of risk aversion.
9Moral Hazard, the policy functions are no longer horizontal but rather con-
cave and upward sloping in current capital. The key corollary of this fact
is that we may think we measure physical adjustment costs to investment,
and/or ﬁnancial constraints, when in fact we are seeing the outcome of a
Moral Hazard problem and vice versa.
4 Experiments
We study one calibration taken from the literature and some deviations from
it. It is worth emphasizing that we are using a one shock model so that we
deliberately limit our ability to match the data in this way. Ingram, Kocher-
lakota and Savin (1994) make the simple point that all models are essencially
unidentiﬁed, with the reverse point that, given enough shocks, we can match
any characteristic of the data. I note also that we are not estimating the
model, although, for the credit constraint model and the adjustment cost
model we are in fact using a calibration that results from estimation.13
4.1 Calibrated outcomes
Before estimating these models we look at a calibrated outcome for the four
models we have described. The following parameter values are loosely taken
from the literature:14
αγ r δη ˆ wφ A ρ σ
0.72 0.10 0.065 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.0 0 510 .111 0.856
The ﬁve models are implemented numerically. The ﬁrst step is to solve
the dynamic programming problems and obtain the optimal decision rules.
For the benchmark unconstrained problem - without constraints, adjustment
costs or moral hazard - the decision rules (or policy functions) in (kt+1,k t)
space are horizontal. Figure 1 shows the four deviations from this benchmark.
The top left ﬁgure shows the policy functions when we add the nonnegativity
constraint. The top right ﬁgure shows the case of adjustment costs. The
bottom left ﬁgure shows the ﬁrst case of moral hazard, and the bottom right
13Note also, that models (FM,AC,MH,MH2) can be nested so that we could actually
estimate one single model to ascertain the relative contribution of each component.
14See Cooper and Ejarque (2001). The parameter gama is estimated by CE to be 0.16.
Here I use 0.10 for graphical purposes, but it aﬀects the G statistics below. The second
Moral Hazard formulation has φ =0 .005, and a constant w calibrated such that ﬁxed
compensation averages 1% of proﬁts, w =ˆ wΠ∗ =0 .01 × Π∗. But it is only the relative
weight of the ﬁxed and variable compensation that matters.
10ﬁgure shows the second case of Moral Hazard with a ﬁxed compensation
component. Clearly all deviations from the ﬁrst case deliver curvature in the
policy function.
In the ﬁrst moral hazard case, the remarkable point is the amount of
curvature we get from a negligible amount of concavity in the utility function.
Part of the reason is the fact that even with minimal concavity, negative
dividends are immediately ruled out, so that at the bottom end of the state
space the optimal decision becomes severely constrained. In the second MH
case, the extent of induced curvature in the policy function is lower.
Armed with these policy functions, I generate n (equal to 300) artiﬁcial
panels of 428 ﬁrms and 12 periods using n artiﬁcial draws for a panel of
shocks.15 T h es a m es h o c k sa r eu s e di nt h eﬁve models within a replication. I
generate artiﬁc i a lv e r s i o n so ft h es a m ed a t au s e dt oc o m p u t et h em o m e n t so f
choice discussed in the data section of the paper.16 The test statistics then
sum over the vector of moments from actual data (D)a n di t sa r t i ﬁcial coun-
terpart (DA) which is itself an average over n replications.17 The measure


















































15The shock process is an AR1 process which is discretized into a ﬁrst order Markov
process using Tauchen´s method with 11 points in the support of the state space for A.
16There is one diﬀerence in the Q regression which arises from the timing assump-
tions for investment. In GH investment becomes productive within the period. Thus,
their measure of average Q is (with their notation) current beggining of period observed
V (At,K t−1)/Kt−1, whereas in the regressions with artiﬁcial data the measure is (with my
notation) EtV (At+1,K t+1)/Kt+1.
17For each model there are 9 moments. Each artiﬁcial moment is computed n times and
then averaged. See the indirect inference approach of Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault.







MH31 0 .14 2.324
We can see that the Adjustment Cost model beats the credit constraint
model in the ability to match the data. This is of course in line with
previous work that shows that for this dataset the credit constraint
adds little to an adjustment cost model. Surprisingly, the second Moral
H a z a r dm o d e ld o e sv e r yw e l la l s o . T h et h i r dM o r a lh a z a r dM o d e li s
the object of the next section.
• I show now averages over the 300 replications for the moments and
models.
σi/k ρi/k σπ/k ρπ/k Q ˆ α3 ˆ α4 Tˆ α5 R2
Data 0.092 0.237 0.094 0.508 2.51 0.036 0.144 1.26 0.12
FM 0.446 −0.395 0.315 −0.175 2.70 −0.411 0.394 0.474 0.85
CC 0.296 −0.294 0.147 0.153 2.67 −0.376 0.422 0.217 0.92
AC 0.106 −0.186 0.189 0.142 2.62 −0.425 0.099 0.970 0.90
MH 0.243 −0.194 0.106 0.526 2.68 −0.131 0.724 3.032 0.93
MH20 .269 −0.252 0.139 0.317 2.66 −0.293 0.507 0.795 0.91
This table raises a number of questions.But ﬁrst we note an interesting
possibility, which is that of combining the Moral hazard curvature with
t h ea d j u s t m e n tc o s tc u r v a t u r et og e tab e t t e ro v e r a l lm a t c ho ft h e
standard deviations and ﬁrst order serial correlations.
• Why do adjustment costs tend to make the dummy signiﬁcant? In the
a p p e n d i xw es e et h a ta sg a m ai n c r e a s e st h eTs t a t i s t i co nt h ed u m m y
also increases.19 Shocks are essencially iid, and desired investment does
18Here, the π in the model that matches the cash ﬂow in the data is given by Rt − It,
or Rt − It − ACt, if apropriate. Revenues are of course Rt = Atkα
t .
19Recall that the dummy here is a rank of the ﬁrms according to their period 7 value
of proﬁts (equal dividends). But proﬁts are already in the regression without the dummy
and they are certainly correlated with their own value in period 7. So, this is still hard to
understand. There is a deeper point here, and that is that this sample split with dividends
does not make much sense here. But neither does it make sense in the data, as the theory
underlying that sample split is shallow at best.
12not vary so much with A. But revenues vary.a lot with A. Then a shock
implies some adjustment in capital is desired, but of a smaller order of
magnitude than the variation in proﬁts. But the whole thing rests on
depreciation. Smaller ﬁrms (low K which happens after a history of low
A´s) want to grow for any mildly positive shock, and so cannot count
on depreciation to save on adjustment costs as big ﬁrms do. And low
Ka l s ol o w e r sp r o ﬁts. So, low proﬁts implies a desire to grow, which
implies the dummy comes out positive and signiﬁcant since the dummy
has value one for low dividend ﬁrms.
• W h yi st h ed u m m yn o ts i g n i ﬁcant with credit constraints? There are
several points to the answer here. First remember that all ﬁrms are
constrained in this sample, just that some should be more constrained
if they are paying low dividends. This is how all models work in the
literature: whether you are constrained or not depends on where you
are. So, low dividends could be a proxy for being constrained. But
apparently they are not when they should be. Here we note two obser-
vations from the literature: Gomes (2000) notes that the value function
has all the information, including that of constraints. So, the dummy
and the cash ﬂow variable can be signiﬁcant only if V/K is the wrong
m e a s u r eo fQ ,w h i c hi st h ec a s eb e c a u s eo fα<1. Second, Cooper
and Ejarque (2001) show that a ﬁrm without credit constraints will
have signiﬁcant cash ﬂow as long as α<1. Here, cash ﬂow is already
signiﬁcant, and since cash ﬂow equals proﬁts in the model, the dummy
adds little explanatory power. But then again, this should be true also
in the data, which is the case of course!
• Why is the dummy so signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst MH problem? I repeat
the argument here (although this is an incomplete explanation): In
the ﬁrst moral hazard case we get a lot of curvature from a negligible
amount of concavity in the utility function, since negative dividends
a r er u l e do u ts ot h a ta tt h eb o t t o me n do ft h es t a t es p a c et h eo p t i m a l
decision becomes very constrained. The curvature we get seems to have
a similar eﬀect to the curvature we get from adjustment costs. Note
that no credit constraints are involved.
• What happens to the value of the ﬁrm relative to the ﬁrst best? In
MH1 the ﬁrst best V/K is 0.94% higher than the market value V/K,
a n di nM H 2t h eﬁrst best V/K is 0.71% higher than the market value
V/K.
• So, since we still cannot explain these regularities in a satisfactory way,
13does this mean we cannot make any inference from this exercise? Not
really: they suggest that if we see a signiﬁcant sample split. we should
be inferring the existence of curvature from either adjustment costs or
Moral Hazard, and not from credit constraints.
5 Moral Hazard, Size Distortions, Takeover
Probabilities
Consider now a further variation on the Moral Hazard problem we just saw.










t +( 1− δ)kt − kt+1 + λkt]
1−η
where curvature arises from utility and lambda measures a preference for
size. The rationale for lambda comes from the divestments that occur after
t a k e o v e r s .T h ef a c tt h a tw es i m p l ya d dΠ + λk is purely for convenience.
There is an additional twist to this model. There is a takeover probability
q =0 .02 every period. The takeover probability is taken from Andrade et
al (2003). Lambda is set at 0.02. Lambda must be of a smaller order of
magnitude than delta. The metric for lambda must come from the size of
divestitures after takeovers, and of course from the diﬀerence in market value
in the ﬁrm, when we get rid of bad managers. But there we have also the
curvature parameter taking a role. In case a takeover happens the manager
gets zero and it is "game over". His problem is
S (At,k t)= m a x
kt+1≥0
u + β(1 − q)EtS (At+1,k t+1)
We see that the probability of takeover shortens the horizon for the man-
ager. This acts in the direction of reducing the capital stock, whereas lambda
acts in the direction of increasing the capital stock. In the event, with these
parameter values capital is lower than in the baseline.
In addition, a simplifying assumption is that in case a takeover happens,
shareholders do not get any rents from it, but rather get only the current
market value of the ﬁr m .T h i si m p l i e sw ec a ns t i l lw r i t e
W (At,k t)=Π(At,k t,g(At,k t)) + βEtW (At+1,k t+1)
which makes the problem much easier.20
20Alternatively we could have the shareholders capturing some of the rent from the
takeover. This could be written: W = Π + β(1 − q)W´+ βq[W´+ φ(V − W´ )] with V
denoting the ﬁr s tb e s tv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm.
14σi/k ρi/k σπ/k ρπ/k Q ˆ α3 ˆ α4 Tˆ α5 R2 K
Data 0.092 0.237 0.094 0.508 2.51 0.036 0.144 1.26 0.12
FM 0.446 −0.395 0.315 −0.175 2.70 −0.411 0.394 0.474 0.85 187.7
CC 0.296 −0.294 0.147 0.153 2.67 −0.376 0.422 0.217 0.92 184.7
AC 0.106 −0.186 0.189 0.142 2.62 −0.425 0.099 0.970 0.90 176.1
MH 0.243 −0.194 0.106 0.526 2.68 −0.131 0.724 3.032 0.93 181.9
MH20 .269 −0.252 0.139 0.317 2.66 −0.293 0.507 0.795 0.91 183.8
MH30 .245 −0.205 0.112 0.501 2.71 −0.163 0.674 2.301 0.93 177.2
In this third Moral Hazard model the capital stock is lower than in the
baseline. The lesson is that even a small takeover probability can successfully
counteract one of the Moral Hazard components, namely the size distortion.
Of course, given the presence of large divestitures in the aftermath of a merger
or takeover, this points in the direction of a diﬀerent model of size distortion,
or simply a much bigger lambda.
The overall ﬁt is not too bad in the unweighed statistic and the T statistic
on the dummy is again high. The standard deviations and serial correlations
seem quite good, which suggests this framework can ﬁt the data.
6 Limited Liability
In this section I move away from the credit constraints literature, and from
trying to match the moments in the Gilchrist and Himmelberg dataset.
Rather, I want to explore other implications of Moral Hazard and compen-
sation structure. Consider now an additional Moral hazard model, still with
exogenous takeover probabilities. The manager now has an objective function









t +( 1− δ)kt − kt+1
which implies that he has complete insurance from the ﬂat wage w,p l u sa
proportional upside in case of positive proﬁts.
The shock A is again an AR1 process with persistence parameter ρ and
standard deviation σ. There is also, as above, a takeover probability q every
period. The probability of takeover shortens the horizon for the manager. In
15case a takeover happens the manager gets zero. His problem is
S (At,k t)= m a x
kt+1≥0
[u + β(1 − q)EtS (At+1,k t+1)]
As usual, in case a takeover happens, shareholders do not get any rents
from it, but rather get only the current market value of the ﬁrm. This implies
we can still write
W (At,k t)=Π(At,k t,g(At,k t)) + βEtW (At+1,k t+1)
What is the impact of designing a contract for management with strong
limited liability? As we will see, the impact is dramatic. In this simple
framework, with moderate concavity in utility, the manager has an incentive
to invest a very l arge amount one p eri o d, and then sell i t all the f ollowi ng
period, creating a cycle of growth and destruction, and cashing in every sec-
ond period when accounting proﬁts are high. In order to avoid such extreme
ﬂu c t u a t i o n s ,w ei m p o s ea" b o r r o w i ng constraint" on the manager,
Π = Atk
α
t +( 1− δ)kt − kt+1 ≥− B
where B is some exogenous borrowing limit. We can justify this by arguing
that large debt decisions must be taken with board aproval, and assume the
board is not captured by management. With this constraint there is a slower
build-up phase, followed by an abrupt sale of capital.
Some companies such as Enron and World Com experienced enourmous
growth, only to collapse later. Here, the optimal decision rule of the man-
ager implies a cycle. At low levels of capital it is optimal for the manager
t o i nve s t ve ry l arg e amo unt s , and t he n r ea p t he b e ne ﬁts of selling al l the
capital again. The compensation structure implies a large cyclicality in the
company. Furthermore, whereas here there is no capital loss in the sale of
used machines, it is also easy to see that introducing a wedge between the
buying and the selling price of capital will not change the behaviour of the
model, while implying large losses for the ﬁrm. This framework easily in-
duces the collapse of the company. Introducing adjustment costs - quadratic
adjustment costs will imply large losses when selling too much capital - will
smooth the behaviour of the ﬁrm, but will not eliminate the incentive for this
cyclical pattern of overinvestment followed by asset sales. Note that observed
output volatility is high, but not because the ﬁrm is in any way adopting a
risky strategy. In the appendix I discuss an extension where the manager can
choose how risky its assets are, in a setting where shareholders will prefer a
less risky investment, but managers can choose the high risk investment due
to the limited liability in their compensation.
16So, what do we learn from this framework? Moral Hazard problems which
arise due to the separation between ownership and control are exacerbated
by the compensation structure with limited liability. This induces volatility
in the ﬁrm’s output, and depending on the model parameters can generate
large losses for the ﬁrm coupled with generous compensation outcomes for
management. Note also that the high output volatility occurs, even if the
manager has substantial concavity in the utility function, because, again, the
manager has a lower bound on compensation.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper explores a variety of investment models trying to identify the
diﬀerent eﬀects of adjustment costs, credit constraints, and distortions arising
from the separation between ownership and control of the ﬁrm. I calibrate
these diﬀerent models, generate artiﬁcial data for each of them, and with the
artiﬁcial data construct a set of moments which are compared to the same
set of moments taken from a cut of the compustat dataset.
The diﬀerent models show a variety of interesting outcomes. Of note is
the fact that models without credit constraints, but where curvature arises ei-
ther from adjustment costs or from the Moral Hazard problems will generate
signiﬁcant sample split outcomes typically associated with the identiﬁcation
of credit constraints. Thus the answer to one of the main questions in this
paper is positive. But other signiﬁcant patterns emerge. The model with
adjustment costs and the model with credit constraints do equivalently well
matching the data. Some of the Moral Hazard models explored here perform
worse - they were not estimated - although they do generate a strong signif-
icance of the sample split dummy - an outcome interesting in its own right.
The model with takeover probabilities suggests that even small values for
this probability can go a long way in counteracting the size distortion part
of Moral Hazard.
There are many reasons for a poor ﬁt of the MH models, the main one
being that the dataset of GH 1995 is not the best suited cut of the compustat
for such an exercise. Being surviving ﬁrms, suggests that they should have
less of a problem with governance than others. Being a sample which has
been cleaned of all episodes of mergers, takeovers, or large changes, it is
also unlikely to be suited to the analysis of the last model with a takeover.
Still, the exercise allows a ﬁrst exploration of the behaviour of these types of
models. And, more importantly, the MH models are not yet estimated.
More substantially, and in the direction of this work, is the study of
the way to model the governance problem in the ﬁrm. A concave objective
17function for the manager - a framework suggested by observations of hedging
of stock options - seems to run counter another observation, namely that
of the higher riskyness of portfolios of ﬁr m sw h i c he n du pb a n k r u p t . T h i s
contradictory intuition may be just apparent. Compensation with limited
liability will induce managers to overinvest and then sell capital cyclically,
even when having a concave objective function. This behaviour can result in
large losses for the ﬁrm, coupled with generous compensation outcomes for
management.
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8 Data Appendix
The data is the cut from Compustat used in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
Some summary statistics of the data are presented here.21 There are 428
ﬁrms and 12 years of data from 1978 to 1989. For each ﬁr ma n de a c hv a r i -
able I compute its mean, standard deviation, ﬁrst order autocorrelation (by
regressing the variable against a constant and its lag and getting the OLS
coeﬃcient on the lag), and the ratio of its standard deviation to its mean over
the 12 period sample. This yields a distribution of 428 means (µ), standard
deviations, (σ), AR1 coeﬃcients, (ρ), and ratios. The following table shows
the cross sectional standard deviation of these ﬁrm level moments:
STD I/K S/K OI/K CF/K V/K
µ 0.0605 1.6953 0.1986 0.1275 1.6609
σ 0.0634 0.5410 0.0905 0.0633 0.8411
ρ 0.3078 0.4300 0.2985 0.3303 0.3495
σ/µ 0.2538 0.1062 0.4510 6.8848 0.1694
Next, I present a series of regression results with diﬀerent estimators
on this data. I do not try to reproduce the regressions of Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995) but rather present a series of regressions that can be
easily reproduced by the reader, and that are equally indicative of the eﬀects
we want to look at later. The basic equation is
It
kt







and I show regression results for three estimators. A simple OLS estimator
in levels wich has 12 observations for each ﬁrm, and 428 ﬁrms for the full
sample. A simple OLS estimator in ﬁrst diﬀerences (but with a constant and
a time trend just the same) which has 11 observations for each ﬁrm. Finally a
basic Instrumental Variables estimator in ﬁrst diﬀerences also with constant
and trend, where the instruments are the second lags of the explanatory
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R2 0.143 0.120 0.085
small small small big big big
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R2 0.127 0.154 0.127 0.156 0.103 0.064
8.1 Investment spikes
This table shows the distribution of I/K in this data. The ﬁrst column shows
the fraction of all observations in a bin (neighborhood). There are 5136
observations. The second column shows the cumulative density. The last
22T h e r ea r et w os a m p l es p l i t s . O n ei sb e t w e e ns m a l la n dl a r g eﬁrms, and another is
between high and low dividend ﬁrms. These are the actual empirical regressions that
can be replicated with the artiﬁcial data. Small ﬁrms are in this data the ﬁrms that are
below the 25th percentile of capital in 1984. Big ﬁrms are above the 25th percentile.
Low dividend ﬁrms are those below the 25th cross section percentile of the 1984 ratio
of dividends to operating income. This is just like in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
Later, with the artiﬁcial data I use mean sample capital stock and mean sample dividends
over revenues for each ﬁrm.













If we deﬁne inaction as investment in the lower two bins we have inaction
less than 10% of the time. If we deﬁne a spike as investment in excess of
one standard deviation higher than the mean, we have spikes around 10%
of the time. This data does not seem to support modelling ﬁxed costs of
adjustment at the ﬁrm level. For that matter, it does not point to ﬁxed costs
of raising external ﬁnance either.
9 Estimation: Changing gama
This is what happpens to our moments and statistics as we increase gama
from the benchmark of the AC model
γσ i/k ρi/k σπ/k ρπ/k Q ˆ α3 ˆ α4 Tˆ α5 R2
Data 0.092 0.237 0.094 0.508 2.51 0.036 0.144 1.26 0.12
0.10 0.106 −0.186 0.189 0.142 2.62 −0.43 0.099 0.97 0.90
0.15 0.081 −0.155 0.206 0.070 2.63 −0.42 0.081 1.85 0.89
0.20 0.065 −0.134 0.217 0.039 2.64 −0.41 0.078 2.44 0.88
0.30 0.048 −0.110 0.232 0.011 2.67 −0.39 0.069 3.13 0.87
∗ ∗∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗








First, overall the model gets worse a st h e r ei sm o r ec u r v a t u r e( a b o v e
γ =0 .2) as measured by the G statistics. This is of course in line with the
estimation results of Cooper and Ejarque. Q increases, investment volatility
falls (as capital adjustment costs increase. This implies that for a given A
distribution, the volatility of proﬁts must increase to take up the slack. Inter-
estingly, the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable in the Q regression becomes
signiﬁcant. Note that the coeﬃcient is positive implying the inference that
low dividend ﬁrms are now signiﬁcantly "constrained" - which we know is
false since there are no constraints in the model.
10 Estimation: Changing alfa
This is what happpens to our moments and statistics as we increase alfa: the
t o pt h r e er o w sa r ef o rt h ec r e d i tc o n s t r a i n tm o d e l . t h eb o t t o mt h r e er o w s
a r ef o rt h ea d j u s t m e n tc o s t sm o d e l .
ασ i/k ρi/k σπ/k ρπ/k Q ˆ α3 ˆ α4 Tˆ α5 R2
Data 0.092 0.237 0.094 0.508 2.51 0.036 0.144 1.26 0.12
0.65 0.2382 −0.3563 0.1676 0.3432 3.0884 −0.4758 0.0562 0.5907 0.908
0.72 0.2693 −0.3264 0.1450 0.2380 2.4906 −0.3524 0.4588 0.8597 0.901
0.80 0.2869 −0.2636 0.1263 0.0898 1.9840 −0.3191 0.7215 −1.088 0.937
0.65 0.0754 −0.1725 0.2387 0.0596 3.2189 −0.3181 0.0875 2.1192 0.861
0.72 0.0807 −0.1532 0.2058 0.0760 2.6295 −0.4199 0.0856 1.7538 0.891








24Both the credit constraints model and the adjustment cost model get
w o r s ea sw em o v ea w a yf r o mt h e0 . 7 2b e n c h m a r k . T h eb e h a v i o u ro fs e r i a l
correlation for proﬁt si so n em o m e n tt h a th a sac l e a rd i ﬀerent behaviour
between the two models.
11 Limited Liability. Part 2, variance choice.
Consider now an additional Moral hazard model, still with exogenous takeover





[w + φΠ(Π > 0)]
1−η
which implies that he has complete insurance from the ﬂat wage w,p l u sa
proportional upside in case of positive proﬁts.
In addition, the manager can choose today between two distributions of
A with equal mean but diﬀerent variances for next period. This choice has
a cost, which for simplicity is an increase in the current depreciation rate.
The shock A = ˜ Aε is now a combination of an AR1 process ˜ A, and an iid
process ε. ˜ A is a technology shock with persistence parameter ρ and standard
deviation σ. There will be a mean preserving spread over the iid shock. The
metric for the variance comes from the high risk nature of the portfolios of
bankruptcy-bound ﬁrms. The aim here is to link such high risk to a Moral
Hazard problem, rather than a survival theory of the Jovanovic type.
There is also, as above, a takeover probability q every period. The prob-
ability of takeover shortens the horizon for the manager. In case a takeover
happens the manager gets zero. His problem is




uH + β(1 − q)EH
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and similarly for the low variance choice.
As usual, in case a takeover happens, shareholders do not get any rents
from it, but rather get only the current market value of the ﬁrm. This implies
we can still write
W (At,k t)=Π(At,k t,g(At,k t)) + βEtW (At+1,k t+1)
25The key idea is that the higher depreciation cost today, by reducing cur-
rent proﬁts will counter the potential future beneﬁt to the decision maker,
from choosing higher variance. There is a reduced mean payoﬀ today, and a
shift in probability mass of the future payoﬀ to the positive tail. The eco-
nomic question is which eﬀect dominates and under what circumstances -
how does the decision depend on current state variables K and A.
What is the economic intuition? Diﬀerent projects have diﬀerent risks but
these risks have equal means. Whereas shareholders should generally prefer
the low risk investment, the manager, due to his truncated payoﬀ contract,
may prefer the higher variance and lower mean project. What project choice
can the model refer to? Perhaps the idea is more of a product choice nature.
The ﬁrm has one plant with a collection of machines, and these machines
depreciate more in the high market risk product. Clearly some or all of the
investment decisions within the ﬁrm have option characteristics. Ideally we
could disaggregate the capital stock into vintages which would correspond
to the diﬀerent options exercised by management each period. The model
constructed is a proxy for these ideas.
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